ABSTRACT. Deregulation ha~ opened up many opportunities and challenges in the transportation industry -opportunities to increase profits and challenges to keep from being outflanked by competition. A goa l of particular intere st to the sc heduled airlines is to set prices more adaptively and to ~h ange them more rapidly. A difficult problem arises when many passengers with different iti neraries compete for a limited number of seats on a single-flight segment. The probl e 11 is complicated by the existence of different fare classes, many flight segments, and different demands acros s time . For any given set of prices, flight-segment capacities, and passenger-carryi ng dem and, there is some number of passe nge rs at each fare class on each flight segment that will optimize reve nue. Knowledge of such an optimum can be used nN only in pricing analysis but also in setting policies to influence the passenger fare-class mix so that the optimum will be more nearly achieved in actual practice.
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We describe a method for identifying the optimum fare-class mix and the design of a system for that purpo se which we built and implemen ted for Front ier Airlines. The recognition and formulation of the problem has become even more important as the number of aircraft in the sky has been reduce and the competition for a limited numbe r of seats has become more intense .
Prior to deregulation, compl~tltlon among carriers was limited by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in two of the three major areas of airline marketingroute authority and pricing -leaving only the amount of capacity (number of flights ) to be made available by anyone carrier over anyone route up to individual carrier management judgment. Competition, therefore, was limited to frills (fancy meals) and flights (departures every hour) .
Pricing policies were generally viewed and analyzed from an industry standpoint bec ause the CAB would not permit any carrier to offer a lower fare that was uneconomic for the industry as a whole . Thus even though a particular fare might benefit a particular carrier at the expense of another carrier, the CAB would not permit the offering of the proposed fare without an extremely strong justification showing clearly that the fare would benefit the general public. The carriers who stood to lose revenue as a result of the lower fare would argue in rebuttal that their loss of revenue would have to be offset by a gencral fare increase in all fares, thereby harming the general public by requiring them to pay a higher fare and in effect subsidizing those few passengers who would benefit from the lower fare proposEd by their competitor.
With the advent of deregulation, caITiers suddenly found themselves facing new forms of competition. New, low-cost, nonunion carriers sprung up in major ma"kets offering transportation at unrestricted fares priced from 30 to 75% below exi:,ting fares. Smaller regional carriers whose route structure had been limited by the CA.B to short-haul, feeder-type operations hubbed around a single major airport such as Denver or St. Louis began to expand into other major cities and compete with the large trunk carriers whose route structures had been designed by the CAB to carry passengers over the longer distances between the major hub cities.
In addition to expanding their services to large cities beyond their old route structures, the regional airlines realized that they could also compete effectively for a p0l1ion of the long-haul pool of traffic that had historically traveled on the trunk carriers' long-haul nonstop flights by offering lower fares on their muItistop or connecting flights.
Since the individual airlines were no longer limited to an industry orientation with regard to their pricing policies, true price competition expanded dramatically. The rewards associated with filling seats (that would otherwise be empty) with low-fare passengers that an airline would otherwise not have carried must be balanced against the risks of displacing higher-fare passengers that would otherwise have been carried.
The problem is complicated by (a) the existence of a multitude of prices (f-lres) with varying degrees of restrictions limiting the availability of all but the highest priced seat; (b) numerous flights operated by a number of airlines over various routings, anyone of which (or combination of two or more) can be used by passengers to get to theil' destinations; and finally, (c) varying degrees of demand for the seats on anyone airline's flight segment over time, depending upon the number of city pairs that can be reasonably serviced by the particular flight, the season of the year. d~ty of week, time of day, quality of service offered (nonstop, one-stop, connection) for a particular passenger's routing vis-a-vis alternative flights either of the same or competitive caITiers.
The Passenger Mix PNblem
The problem faced by the airlines then may be termed the "pricing and passenger mix" problem. The problem has relevance not only for airlines but also for other segments of the carrier industry. One might substitute the term" load mix" in alternative settings; e.g., for a trucking company or steamship company that has :l set of regularly scheduled routes and which faces decisions of the type elaborated below.
With the elimination of certain government restrictions, airlines now have more opportunity to explore different pricing and routing options and to seek for each the best mix of passengers [Murphy, 1980] . The determination of this mix provides two major outcomes: (1) it ~nables the airline to structure its reservation system more effectively, setting appropriate limits and priorities governing the number of passengers at different fare classes traveling on different flights; (2) it allows different price/route scenarios to be evaluated in consideration of the profit generated from the best passenger mix, relative to a given scenario .
The passenger mix problem may therefore be viewed as serving both a "tactical" (reservation monitoring) objective and a " strategic" (price/route setting) objective. To meet these objectives , a computer-based system embodying a convenient, user-friendly model and a highly efficient solution method is needed. A system that fails to exhibit these characteristics will not only incur undesirable costs in terms of human and computer resources but will also seriously inhibit scenario analysis and responsiveness to changing conditions [Dembo and Mulvey, 1976; Glover and Klingman, 1978; Glover, McMillan, and Tay lor, 1977] .
This paper describes the development of a system based on a network-related model that meets the dual criteria of convenience and efficiency, a system implemented for Frontier Airlines . We will first provide a description of the passenger pricing and passenger mix problem and some Jf its practical implications, and then develop the network-related model by reference to a simplified illustration. Finally, we will describe supporting software features that provide additional user convenience and report preliminary computational experience.
Features of the Pricing and Passenger Mix Problem
The profitability of a passenger to the carrier depends on the length of the trip and the fare class he travels . While revenue per mile is generally less for passengers traveling long distances, the total revenue to the carrier is greater for those passengers .
Associated with each passenger on a given flight segment is an opportunity cost, in that each passenger on a given flight segment occupies a seat that might have gone to another passenger traveling a more profitable itinerary or at a more profitable fare class. Thus on a flight which connects terminals A, B, and C (in that order), a local passenger traveling only from B to C occupil!s a seat that might have gone to a passengEr traveling A to C, a through trave.:er. The traveler from B to C may therefore be responsible for an empty seat on segment A to B of that flight or on some segment of another flight involved in the passenger itinerary (PI) which includes segment B to C. On each segment of each flight in a carrier's network there may be many PI's, passengers traveling from many different origins to many different destinations and in different fare classes.
Given a forecast of the demand for PI's on anyone day at the various fare classes and over the carrier' s entire network, there exists a theoretically optimal mix of PI's at the various fare classes. The opLmal mix is that mix of passenger itineraries and associated fare classes which maximizes the carrier's total revenue that day. The optimal mix of PI's can be expressed in terms of the best number of PI's in various fare classes on each segment of each flight; that is, th e optimal occupancy of the available seats on each segment of each flight.
Much of the planning done at the operat ions level in the scheduled airlines focuses on PI's and the demand for them at the various fare classes. Marketing managers endeavor to design fare class structures, in association with PI's, so as to increase occupancy and thus increase revenue. It is a complex business in that fare class modification and the offering of special discounts may result in "spill" and "diversion. " In Figure 2 , two tlights are represented schematically: Flight I connects A to B to C, in that order, and Flight 2 connects C to B to D. Flight I arrives at B one hour prior to Flight 2's arrival at B, so that passengers on the first segment of Flight I can transfer to Flight 2 at B for continued travel to D. I am IIriting to infonn you that the deci.ion .upport system described in the paper, "The Passenger Mix Problem in the Scheduled Airlines," by Glover and others was in fact constructed and has been implemented at Frontier Airlines.
We are using that system p"esently, and it has improved our capability of pri c i ng our produc t and deve 1 opi ng our di scount j nven tory. It has al so given us the ability to give v~ll'able cormtents to our scheduling department as well as to provide input;to ")lr planning function. 
